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This paper is an exploratory review of various firewall philosophies, technologies, and architec­
tures. Commonly used firewall technologies are described in general, including packet filtering, 
proxy server, circuit-level gateway, and stateful multilayer inspection. The strengths and weak­
nesses of these technologies are compared. Standard firewall architectures such as the screening 
router architecture, the dual-homed host architecture, the screened host architecture, the screened 
subnet architecture and their variations are examined and the pros and cons are summarized.
Issues involving firewall building in practice are addressed for a hypothetical small software de­
velopment company. A few assumptions are made in order to apply the reviewed material to the 
hypothetical example. Four steps in firewall building are followed. First, the network service needs 
are identified. Next, the security concerns associated with these needs are analyzed. Third, 
security policies are specified to address the security concerns. Last, firewall alternatives are pro­
posed to implement these policies.
Although the example is hypothetical in nature, the assumptions made are relatively representa­
tive of many small-to-medium-sized software development companies today with respect to fire­
wall applications.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
In the past two decades, the fast growth of internetworking technology has been providing 
individuals, corporate companies, and government agencies tremendous flexibility and 
convenience. People use their networked computer facilities to store and access private, 
confidential, or business-critical data.
Being able to access information through interconnected network systems has brought many 
advantages; however, it has also brought many security concerns as well. For many business 
corporations and government agencies, in fact, information security is one of the most critical. The 
goals of information security are generally described as; 1) data integrity, 2) data confidentiality, 
and 3) data availability (Chapman and Zwicky, 1995; Lynch and Rose, 1993). Compromises of 
data in any form may have serious consequences such as invasion of privacy, incorrect or poor 
decision making, sensitive information leakage, inadequate accounting, and so on (Chapman and 
Zwicky, 1995; Cheswickand Bellovin, 1994; Eckel, 1995).
Besides data security, networked hardware and software resources (e.g., servers, routers, 
links, CPU, storage devices, printing facilities, operating systems, and user applications, etc.) can 
be the targets of hackers as well. Attacking or illegally using hardware and software resources by 
hackers was a more serious problem in the early networking days than it is today. As networked 
computer hardware and software becomes ever cheaper and more affordable, this type of attack 
becomes less of a concern.
Breaches of network security often take both malicious and non-malicious forms. Malicious 
attacks are those intended to cause some negative impact on the target, such as systems being 
damaged by harmful viruses, systems being overloaded with pings, web sites being defaced, or 
some form of espionage such as information theft, destruction, or modification. Non-malicious 
attacks are generally not intended to cause damage to the target; some examples are joyriding, 
score keeping, and benign computer worms (Chapman and Zwicky, 1995). Attacks on network 
resources and information are becoming more serious as the networking community grows larger 
and more people begin to access the Internet.
i
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Certain instances that occurred in the late 80’s during the development of the Internet have 
increased the public’s attention towards network security. One such instance, of course, is the 
infamous 1988 worm attack (Chapman and Zwicky, 1995; Louw and Duffy, 1992).
A formal definition for network security is hard to give. Broadly speaking, network security 
refers to the capabilities that support protection of the network infrastructure against abuse and the 
prevention of network users from compromising data integrity, confidentiality and availability. 
Network security is intended to protect sensitive information found on devices attached to a 
network by controlling access points to the information (Leinwand and Fang, 1993), assuring that 
users, local or remote, are authenticated, and access to services and information is authorized 
(Cooper et al, 1995; Eckel, 1995; Hunt, 1992; Miller, 1993).
For network security administrators, making their LAN safe and secure from attackers while 
still keeping a connection to external networks can be a major problem. Security management 
involves identification of risks and security needs, development of security policies and assessment 
of the capabilities in technical and social terms. It involves installing and maintaining 
authentication and encryption systems to ensure that remote communication circuits are adequately 
protected. It also involves technical evaluation tools for network protocol correctness and 
robustness. Security management also means activity monitoring, as well as design and execution 
of quick countermeasures when one or more aspects of security mechanisms is breached. 
Leinwand and Fang (1993) have summarized four major steps necessary to accomplish security 
management: 1) identifying what needs to be protected, 2) finding the access points, 3) designing 
security mechanisms to secure these access points, and 4) maintaining and enhancing security 
mechanisms.
While it is important to be concerned about network security, it also has to be agreed that easy 
access to information and network security work at cross purposes. Networking is a compromise 
between convenience and security, as enhanced security will always undermine a LA N’s usefulness 
lor authorized users.
In recent years, a wide variety of tools and techniques have been developed to help system 
administrators secure their networks. Firewalls are one of the most popular. A firewall is an 
integrated hardware/software package that resides between an internal network and one or more 
external network(s). All communication between internal and external networks must go through 
tlie firewall (Chapman and Zwicky, 1995; Cheswick and Bellovin, 1994; Cooper et al, 1995).
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Firewall is a general term because it does not really refer to one particular mechanism or 
technology that can be used to achieve such a purpose. Rather, it refers to a broad range of 
mechanisms or technologies that can be adopted to make an internal network system secure while 
still maintaining some reasonable connectivity with the outside world.
Firewalls are becoming more and more popular for sites that need security at the network 
level. Thus, it is important and useful for us to have some general understanding about die 
technology.
1.2 Proposal
The goal of this paper is to gain a thorough understanding of firewall strategies and principles 
by providing an exploratory review of various firewall technologies, architectures, and products. 
Further, the information reviewed in the paper will be applied to address some of the network 
security problems in one hypothetical situation. More specifically, the following objectives will be 
achieved:
A. To describe the firewall philosophy and principles in general;
B. To review commonly used firewall technologies— what kinds of security policies each of these 
technologies can enforce and their strengths and weaknesses;
C. To review standard firewall architectures and their variations— describe what kinds of network 
security problems each of these architectures can address and their pros and cons;
D. To describe in general some major commercial and freeware firewall products;
E. To apply the information reviewed and present alternatives for implementing feasible firewall 
mechanisms in a hypothetical small software development company. Three steps will be 
followed to achieve this objective: 1) to identify the security needs, 2) to define the security 
policies that will be targeted to address these needs, and 3) as one of the many security aspects, 
to determine what firewall architecture(s) and product(s) can be used to enforce these policies. 
When identifying the security needs, only those that can be effectively addressed by using 
firewall techniques will be focused on. When applying the information reviewed in this 
hypothetical situation, a few assumptions will be made on the network configuration (hardware 
and software) and security needs in order to present some “feasible” firewall alternatives.
2. FIREWALL PHILOSOPHY AND PRINCIPLES
According to the definition given in the W ebster’s New World Dictionary (1988), a firewall is 
“a fireproof wall to prevent the spread of fire, as from one room or compartment to the next.” 
Today, this concept has been widely adopted in the internetworking world as a means of regulating 
communication between networks to guard valuable network resources and to ensure information 
security, often in conjunction with other forms of security measures such as authentication, 
authorization, privacy enhancement, and monitoring. Specific implementations of firewalls include 
packet filters, proxy servers, circuit-level gateways, and stateful multilayer inspection. These will 
be described in Chapter 3.
A firewall can function as an efficient choke point for inbound and outbound network traffic 
to allow and deny services based on established security policies. It can be used to keep 
meaningful traffic records between the internal and external systems. A firewall can also be used 
internally to hide more critical network segments from those which are less critical. However, a 
firewall cannot protect against internal threats. Further, since a firewall typically does not scan the 
details of the data passing through it, it can not protect against data-oriented threats such as 
viruses.
When it comes to the design and implementation of firewalls, certain philosophies and 
principles apply.
2.1 Philosophy
Following the traditional firewall definition, an internal system can be protected by isolating it 
from external sources where danger or “fire” can possibly originate. The fundamental purpose of 
firewalls is to restrict the flow of information between networks (Figure 1). The degree of 
restriction depends on how much a site relies on external services and how well it needs to be 
secured from potential external threats.
There are two major security philosophies:
1) The rule o f default-deny, i.e., that which is not expressly permitted is prohibited;
4
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2) The rule o f default-permit, i.e., that which is not expressly prohibited is permitted. 
Firewalls generally follow the rule o f default-deny. It is considered much safer than the rule 
of default-permit. One only needs to worry about those cases to be allowed (Chapman and 
Zwicky, 1995; Cheswick and Bellovin, 1994; Cooper et al, 1995).
2.2 Principles
There are also some general security principles to apply for firewall design, implementation, 
and evaluation. First, the number of inbound and outbound services allowed by a site should be 
minimized in order to reduce the chance of a security breach of the internal network. This is called 
the rule of least privilege.
Firewall defense should have certain depth, i.e., the firewall should have multilayer defense. 
If a firewall has only one layer of defense, such as a bare-bone screening router firewall or a dual­
homed firewall (see Chapter 4), the whole defense collapses once the screening router or the dual­
homed host is compromised, and system administrators do not even have time to respond to any
External Network(s)
—j- Internal Network
Figure 1. A firewall model shows that a firewall is a special hardware- and software-based 
network security system setup between internal network and external network(s) to protect 
the internal network from being harmed by external threats.
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kind o f attacks.
Legitimate access channels by external users to internal information or resources should be 
narrowed as much as possible. As a matter of fact, the majority, if not all, of inbound and 
outbound network traffic should be forced to go through a firewall or a set of firewalls that guard 
internal systems. A strategically placed network firewall serves as a choke point where security 
rules can be enforced and network traffic can be monitored and controlled.
A firewall should also be a dedicated system. Components, hardware or software, needed to 
build a firewall should only be used to implement functionality that are solely related to security 
between the internal and external systems. A firewall should never provide additional non-firewall 
functionality that has nothing to do with the security between the internal and external systems. To 
ensure this, a host used in a firewall generally should run a bare-bones standard or proprietary 
operating system.
A firewall should also be designed and implemented so that when it fails to function properly, 
it will not open the door wider for attackers than the situation with a properly functioning firewall. 
Tins may mean a complete shutdown of the firewall and no network traffic, legal or illegal, will 
How between the internal and external. This rule is called the fail-safe rule. As we mentioned 
earlier, firewall building generally follows the rule o f default-deny since it is safer than the rule of 
default-permit. It may irritate users if one forgets to allow something needed, but it is safer than 
forgetting to deny something that is potentially dangerous.
A good firewall should be as transparent as possible to the users in order to minimize the 
inconvenience for insiders and to hide the existence of a firewall from outsiders.
Firewall monitoring is also a very important aspect. Monitoring will alert security personnel 
when a system is compromised, will indicate the nature of the attacks, and will provide sufficient 
logging information so that potential design and operational flaws in a firewall can be analyzed. A 
firewall should be designed and implemented so that monitoring is carried out as automatically as 
possible.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that security can only be achieved through diversified 
mechanisms in a defense system. Firewalls offer some promising technical alternatives for many 
types of security threats; however, a firewall will not guarantee security if other aspects of security 
are neglected.
3. FIREWALL CLASSIFICATION
In this chapter, four commonly used firewall technologies are described in general, including 
packet filtering, proxy servers, circuit-level gateway, and stateful multilayer inspection. The 
strengths and weaknesses of these technologies are compared.
Packet filters are mostly used to implement security policies at the network and transport 
layers in the TCP/IP Reference Model. Theoretically, firewall gateways can implement security 
using information at all levels of the model, although the process is typically done at the 
application level (proxy servers) and sometimes at the transport layer (circuit-level gateways). 
Stateful multilayer inspection, on the other hand, has become more popular in some commercial 
firewall products in recent years; security is implemented by using information at all levels of the 
model.
Detailed discussions about packet filtering and proxy servers are given by Chapman and 
Zwicky (1995) and by Cheswick and Bellovin (1994). Circuit-level gateways are described by 
Cheswick and Bellovin (1994). Only limited information is available on stateful multilayer 
inspection.
3.1 The TCP/IP Reference Model
In order to describe the technical details of firewall components, it is necessary for us to have 
some basic knowledge about the TCP/IP Reference Model, what a packet is, and how a port 
works. The characteristics described here are only those relevant to firewalls.
3.1.1 Overview
Most network systems are described using two important architectures: the Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model and the TCP/IP Reference Model. Designed to serve as a 
standard to allow various open systems to communicate with each other, the OSI Reference Model 
provides a seven-layer reference for protocols for interconnection of cooperative computer systems. 
The TCP/IP Reference Model, on the other hand, is the traditional model used to describe the 
ARPANET and its descendant, the Internet. Since most firewall concepts and theories are built 
and described using the TCP/IP Reference Model, a brief review about this model is deemed 
necessary.
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According to Stevens (1994) and Tanenbaum (1996), the TCP/IP Reference Model consists 
of four layers: the application layer, the transport layer, the network layer, and the data link layer1, 
as shown in Figure 2. The four layers are also collectively referred to as tine protocol stack. Each 
layer has its unique responsibilities and may have one or more protocols to fulfill these 
responsibilities. In general, the lower three layers are solely responsible for network 
communication and they are usually implemented in the operating system. The highest layer, the 
application layer, is usually a user process which handles application details.
Transport Layer
Netw ork Layer
Data Link Layer Data Link Layer
Transport Layer
Application Layer
Netw ork Layer
Application Layer
Client
Physical Connection-
-Application layer protocol
■Transport layer protocol
■Network layer protocol
Link layer protocol
Server
Figure 2. The four layers in the TCP/IP Network Model, also known as the protocol stack.
More specifically, the data link layer is implemented in the device drivers and in the network 
interface card which handles die hardware interface to a network. This layer usually provides 
reliable communication between directly connected hosts. Reliability is often partly achieved with 
a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) check on the frames being transmitted. Commonly used 
protocols at this layer include Ethernet, FDDI, and Token Ring. The network layer handles the 
movement of packets around an internetwork; that is, routing is handled at this layer. The
1 The other three layers (the presentation layer, the session layer, and the physical layer) in the OSI Reference Model 
are usually insignificant in the TCP/IP context.
9
protocols often used in this layer are IP, ICMP, IPX, and IGMP. The transport layer, similar to the 
data link layer, provides for delivery of data passed down from the application layer of the sending 
host to the transport layer of the receiving host; however, the hosts need not be directly connected. 
There are two types of TCP/IP transport protocols; TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and 
UDP (User Datagram Protocol). TCP requires a connection to be established before data can be 
transmitted between two hosts and thus it is a more reliable but less efficient protocol. UDP does 
not require a connection at the time the data is transmitted and thus is less reliable but more 
efficient. The application layer is the layer which provides end-user services such as file transfer 
and e-mail. This layer does not know anything about the movement of data across the network. 
For an application that runs over UDP, the application layer can also be configured to ensure the 
reliability of the data. Some traditional examples of network applications are FTP (File Transfer 
Protocol), SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol), SNMP (Simple Network Management 
Protocol), and Telnet. A network application usually consists of two components: a client and a 
server. Each component processes data according to the four layers as described above and may 
have one or more protocols at each layer to communicate with its peer layer on other end of the 
communication.
3.1.2 Packets
Packets are short messages sent from one host to any other hosts across network(s). They are 
the fundamental units for network communication in packet-switched network systems. In the 
application layer, a packet consists of pure application data. At the sending end, data is passed 
down along the protocol stack. In the process, each lower layer adds a header to the upper level 
packet passed down to it and forms the packet specific to that layer. Thus, in the three lower 
layers, each packet2 consists of two major parts— a header and a body. A packet from a given 
upper layer is treated as the data in the next lower layer. The whole process of adding headers layer 
by layer is called encapsulation. At the receiving end, the process works the opposite way— the 
headers are removed as a lower level packet travels upward along the protocol stack. This process 
is called demultiplexing (Stevens, 1994).
2 Depending on the specific protocol used at a given layer, a packet may have different names, such as TCP segment, 
UDP datagram, Ethernet frame, etc.
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As far as security is concerned, the header of a TCP transport layer packet provides three 
useful pieces of information, the TCP source port, the TCP destination port, and the TCP flags 
field, assuming an application is using TCP in this layer. In the flags field, the condition of the 
ACK bit can be checked to implement some security policies. The header of a network layer 
packet contains an options field which is usually empty, however, it can be used by hackers to 
attack an internal system.
3.1.3 Port
For a TCP-based or UDP-based application, in order to communicate with each other, the 
client and the server each need to create an end point called a socket. Each socket includes the IP 
address of the host and a 16-bit number local to that host. This 16-bit number is called a port. 
Port numbers below 256 are usually reserved for standard services such as FTP, HTTP, SMTP, 
SNMP, and Telnet.
For a TCP-based service, a connection has to be explicitly established between a socket at the 
client end and a socket at the server end. Some services even need multiple connections to be 
established. For example, both the normal mode and passive mode FTP requires two connections 
be established between the client and the server, one for command exchange and the other for the 
actual file transferring. In normal mode, an FTP client first randomly allocates two ports above 
1023. It uses one of the two ports to open the command channel connection with the server’s port 
21 and then issues a PORT command to tell the server the second port it uses. After receiving the 
command, the server uses its port 20 to establish the data channel connection.
For UDP-based applications, a source port and a destination port need to be specified for a 
UDP datagram, although no connection is required between the client and the server.
3.2 Packet Filtering
Traditionally, routers are used to determine the correct network address to which they should 
forward a packet (Miller, 1995; Perlman, 1992; Stallings, 1994). Packet filtering uses a router in 
a more sophisticated way. It implements security by checking the information carried in the header 
of a packet. The header of a packet may contain the following information which can be used by a 
packet filter: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, the message type, and
11
so on. The widely used pieces of information include the source and destination addresses and the 
well-known protocol ports.
Using packet filters to achieve security only using host addresses is not very common. Tliis is 
because source addresses of incoming packets can be easily forged. Essentially, their usage for 
security at this level is limited to only two forms. If an external site is considered to be unfriendly, 
packet filters can be configured to disallow any connection to be established with that site. Packer 
filters are also very effective for eliminating packets with forged internal addresses.
Packet filters are mostly used to achieve security at service level, although this requires that 
the protocol port assignment be somewhat fixed. If a well-known service is considered unsafe, the 
service can be denied by dropping all the packets with the port number associated with that service 
(for instance, the use of inbound unsecured Telnet can be denied by dropping incoming packets 
with destination port 23).
For a TCP connection, the very first packet sent from the client to the server does not have the 
ACK bit set and all the subsequent packets will have the bit set. Without the request packet, the 
packets of a connection can not be reassembled by either end to make the communication 
meaningful. Provided that all request packets are examined with sufficient caution, subsequent 
TCP packets can be allowed to flow through without too much security concerns. Thus, incoming 
TCP packets with the ACK bit set can be allowed to flow into an internal system.
As we have mentioned earlier, the header of a network layer packet contain an options field 
which is usually empty. Only in a source routed packet, the source route option field is used to 
specify the route the packet supposed to take to its destination. The routing decision is made based 
on the information provided in the source route option instead of that given in the routing table of a 
router along the way. This mechanism is seldom used by system administrators except for casual 
network debugging, however, it is often used by hackers to attack a host. Thus, it is also a general 
filtering rule that a packet with the IP source routing option set should be dropped.
Relatively speaking, packet filtering is a simple and inexpensive way to build a firewall 
because most routers can be configured to perform filtering. On the other hand, packet filtering is 
a less reliable approach than other types of firewall technologies because there are many kinds of 
packets and it is always easy to forget to deny some of them. To ensure that security can not be
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easily compromised, packet filters often have to be used in conjunction with other firewall 
components.
Cooper et al. (1995) have summarized six steps when a packet filter is used in a firewall 
architecture, whether it is used by itself or in conjunction with other firewall components. Some 
examples for packet filtering rule specification are provided in Chapter 5. The six rules are:
1) Define packet filtering rules for the ports of the packet filter and store them in order of 
importance. The order of the rules is critical;
2) Process a packet by parsing the headers (mostly IP, TCP, and/or UDP) and examining the 
information stored in those security related fields;
3) Check the information retrieved from the headers against the packet filtering rules 
according to the order they are listed;
4) If a rule states that the packet can be transmitted or accepted, it is allowed;
5) If a rule states that the packet should not be transmitted or accepted, it is dropped;
6) If no rule can be found to deal with the packet, apply the default-deny rule and drop the 
packet.
3.2.1 Advantages
The following are some advantages of packet filtering;
1. No additional cost since filtering functionality comes with most routers, commercial or non­
commercial;
2. Packet filters can be used to control most network traffic effectively. Especially, traffic
from/to untrusted machines and networks can be effectively restricted or denied;
3. Effective for eliminating source address forgery— incoming packets that claim to come from a 
host in the protected network;
4. If a well-known service is considered unsafe, packet filters can be used to drop the packets 
associated with this service. The service can be supported using other firewall approaches 
such as proxy servers;
5. One screening router can offer a great deal of protection for the entire system;
6. No specialized user procedures are required. In fact, packet filters can be used regardless of 
what users do. Thus, they can achieve a high level of transparency;
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7. Packet filters can be used to log certain types of information, especially when a packet is 
dropped because a filtering rule has explicitly denied it. Information that should be logged 
about a dropped packet include source/destination addresses, source/destination ports, options 
flags, and the filtering rule that had been violated, etc. As a rule of thumb, the logging 
information should be kept in a separate location just in case the filter itself is compromised;
8. Packet filters are suitable for controlling DNS zone transferring— one DNS server asking 
another DNS server to transfer all DNS data to it. When used together with DNS proxy 
servers, an internal DNS can be hidden from the external network(s).
3.2.2 Disadvantages
Disadvantages of packet filtering include:
1. Configuration and maintenance is a major burden for most packet filters. Most free and 
commercial products lack a good configuration interface, although this is improving in some 
leading commercial products. It takes a great deal of knowledge to design, implement, and use 
a packer filter safely;
2. Error-prone. Although firewall building generally follows the rule o f default-deny, network 
traffic involves volumes of packets and it is always easy to forget to deny some which may be 
potentially insecure. A buggy or incorrectly configured packet filter can be potentially 
detrimental. A failed packet filter may still pass packets into the internal system. In another 
words, packet filters may not be fail-safe;
3. If a service is needed but the service itself has security holes, packet filtering alone can not 
protect a site. Because a filter can be configured to allow or deny a service, but a filter can not 
modify a service to eliminate or get around its security deficiencies. Some other approaches 
have to be considered in such cases;
4. Some inbound services (such as inbound Telnet) or services that involve multi-channel 
connections (such as FTP and X I 1) cannot be easily secured using pure packet filtering 
mechanisms. The client-server relationship in FTP and X I 1 is somewhat obscure when 
compared to services that requires only single channel connection. The fundamental difficulty 
that is involved in securing these services using packet filtering is that when the inbound 
connection(s) needed for these services are allowed, the system can be easily potentially
14
attacked, especially data-driven attack. If these kind of services are needed, we have to ensure 
security through means other than firewalls. For instance, more secure versions of these 
services can be used so external hosts are strictly authenticated and data is properly encrypted. 
Internal firewalls can also be used so the more sensitive internal network segments are 
separated from those less sensitive ones;
5. The lookup function of DNS is also not a good candidate for packet filtering. As a distributed 
database system for mapping host names from/to IP addresses, DNS deals with sensitive 
information that can potentially be used by hackers to get a list of targets quickly or to fool a 
protected host by using some incomplete DNS records;
6. Since the filtering rules are static, no context is kept about the network traffic and connection. 
Decisions are made only based on the information carried by the packet under examination. 
This creates difficulty for monitoring analysis.
3.3 Proxy Servers
Proxy servers are also known as application or application-level gateways. Proxy servers are 
used to provide access to external internetwork via a single host or limited number of hosts running 
specialized applications or server programs. The host is usually a dual-homed host or a bastion 
host that has access to the external internetwork and can be accessed from hosts in the internal 
network.
A proxy service consists of two parts: a proxy server and a proxy client. A dual-homed host 
or a bastion host running the proxy server is usually transparent to the user. The proxy server 
approach implements a firewall by building a physical barrier between a client in the internal 
network system and a server in the external network(s). If a particular service provided by a server 
in the external internetwork is considered unsafe but is still needed by a site, a proxy server, 
usually service specific, can be used to “fix” or get around the security holes of the service. Proxy 
servers can make the request and take care of the traffic on behalf of the client. First, the client 
connects to the proxy server to make the request, then the proxy server determines whether the 
request is legitimate. If the request is legitimate, it then talks to the real server on behalf of the 
client, retrieves tire requested information and passes it back to the client. If tire user wants to talk 
to tire outside world, the program on his/her machine first talks to the machine running tire proxy
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server. Then the proxy server assesses the request from the user machine and decides whether to 
relay the request to the real server on behalf of the user. When replies come back from the real 
server, the proxy server passes them back to the user (Figure 3). Normally, the user’s perception 
is that s/he is talking to the real server, more or less, “directly” without any intermediate agent, or 
in another words, proxy servers are usually transparent to the client.
Some proxy servers are specialized software for particular services, such as the HTTP and 
FTP proxy server. Some standard services can be configured to be self-proxying, such as a 
standard SMTP server.
Usually, a proxy client needs to be configured or even modified in order to make proxying 
work. This can be done either by obtaining an appropriate version, or by obtaining the source code 
and modify it. Many clients, such as Web browsers, come pre-configured to work with proxy 
servers.
A proxy server needs to be configured so it can interact with both the client and the real 
server. The TIS Firewall Toolkit includes a set of proxy servers such as ftp-gw, plug-gw (for 
socket-to-socket service), and tn-gw (for Telnet service). These proxy servers do not require client 
user interface be modified.
ms
Proxy Server
Proxy Client Real Server
Figure 3. A proxy system consists of a proxy client, a proxy server, and a real server. Proxy 
servers are usually run on dual-homed hosts with routing capabilities disabled or on well- 
fortified bastion hosts.
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3.3.1 Advantages
The following are some advantages of proxy servers:
1. Proxying does not require any special hardware, it only needs a dual-homed or bastion host on 
which it can be run;
2. Although the actual proxying process provides users indirect access to the outside world, die 
users’ perception, more or less, is that they have access to the outside world directly;
3. Since proxy servers are mostly service specific, die mechanism can provide very effective 
logging. In most cases, one only need to record the information in order to keep logging 
meaningful, such as the commands and options used by the particular service being proxies;
4. Proxy servers can be used to do some content analysis for possible information leakage, 
however, for both privacy and performance concerns, this feature should be used with great 
caution;
5. The proxy server approach seems to be a more complicated approach, but in many cases it is 
also a far more secure and effective approach than other alternatives. Only those insecure 
services need to be proxied, without worrying too much about filtering rules or keeping track 
of potentially numerous untrusted hosts;
6. A buggy proxy server is usually fail-safe. A failed proxy server will stop providing the service 
for the client;
7. Most DNS servers have built-in proxy features so that one can serve as a proxy server for 
another. DNS servers always function as proxy servers for regular clients. As we have 
mentioned earlier, packet filters are suitable for controlling DNS zone transferring. If a pair of 
DNS servers— one is the internal server, one is the external proxy server— is used together 
with a packet filter, the internal DNS can be hidden from incoming DNS lookups;
8. Proxy servers can be used for address translation or remapping;
9. Proxy servers can be easily used for store-and-forward applications which make provisions for 
redirection, such as SMTP, because no new or specialized client program needs to be provided.
3.3.2 Disadvantages
Disadvantages of proxy servers include:
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1. Proxy servers require that internal host(s) cannot have direct communication with the external 
system(s). They have to be used together with some kind of IP-level restriction between the 
client and the real server, using mechanisms such as dual-homed host or packet filtering. If a 
dual-homed host is used, the host should be configured so normal packet routing is not 
allowed. If no IP-level restriction is applied, then proxy servers can be easily bypassed;
2. Proxy servers are service-specific for many services. A proxy server is usually only targeted 
to a single service or a limited set of services, for example, an FTP proxy server is usually 
only used to proxy a particular FTP service;
3. To be able to proxy a service, the system administrator usually has to modify the client, and 
sometimes the client interfaces. For some services, it is impossible to insert a proxy server 
between the client and the real server, especially when the communication of the service is too 
“disorganized” for a security administrator to specialize the client or the client interface, such 
as talk used in UNIX systems;
4. The implementation of proxy servers usually falls behind the targeted services unless they are 
designed to have built-in proxying capabilities— such as a standard HTTP server. It takes 
considerable amount of time to understand a service and then design and implementation a 
proxy server;
5. Performance of proxy servers is usually a concern due to the cost of context switching—  
packets that go through proxy servers have to be demultiplexed and encapsulated;
6. Proxy servers can not protect the data because a proxy server has to know tire data in order to 
judge whether it was dangerous or not—  the data will be exposed once the server is 
compromised;
7. For applications that do not make provisions for redirection, a specialized client program has 
to be provided in order to make proxying feasible. Often, the client software has to be 
modified so it knows how to talk with the proxy server, or the normal procedure of the service 
has to be customized so that the client can talk to the proxy server first and request the proxy 
server to contact the outside network on behalf of it;
8. Proxy servers may not be sufficient to ensure security in some situations. One solution for this 
is to use an intelligent proxy server that filters out insecure commands of a service, however, it
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is difficult to design and implement such a server, and some of the important functionality of 
die service may have to be compromised;
9. Some clients and procedures can not be modified for proxying, such as ping and traceroule. 
Since most such services are usually small and inherently safe, direct support of tiiese services 
on a bastion host is generally not a big security concern as long as some mechanism (a shell, 
for instance) are provided to allow users to use only these services but not those that are being 
proxied.
3.4 Circuit-Level Gateways
Also known as general-purpose proxy servers. The circuit-level gateway approach 
implements a firewall by relaying TCP connections between the internal and die external 
network(s). After the connection is established between certain ports, the circuit-level gateway in 
die firewall copies data back and forth and does some checking in the relaying process. In general, 
circuit-level gateways don’t check the data, but some kind of logging information is kept on the 
number of bytes and the nature of the connection for later use in case a security breach has 
occurred. Similar to proxy servers, die relay mechanism used by circuit-level gateways requires 
diat die client program be modified or completely rewriden.
In a sense, circuit-level gateways are very similar to proxy servers because they also use the 
proxy mechanism to secure a service. In some classifications they are not even distinguished from 
die application gateways— the proxy servers (Chapman and Zwicky, 1995).
3.4.1 Advantages
Some advantages of circuit-level gateways include:
1. Not service-specific. A circuit-level gateway can handle a collection of services if it is 
designed and implemented properly;
2. Can be used to effectively achieve security for some UDP services, such as printing service;
3.4.2 Disadvantages
Circuit-level gateways have the following disadvantages;
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1. Only suitable for services that have simple clients and straightforward client interfaces. This 
type of firewall components is not widely used in common firewall architectures;
2. Requires new or modified client program in order to create a virtual circuit for the proxy 
process;
3. A application that requires a specific local port is hard to be secured using circuit-level 
gateways.
3.5 Stateful Multilayer Inspection
Also called dynamic packet filtering, stateful multilayer inspection is not really a new firewall 
technology. However, it is not widely used in traditional firewall products due to some 
design/implementation difficulties and performance concerns. It is known used in a few 
commercial products, such as Checkpoint Firewall 1, CYC ON Labyrinth Firewall, and ON Guard 
Firewall. It seems the technology is gradually growing in maturity in the last couple of years.
Very limited technical information is available for stateful multilayer inspection. In general, 
stateful multilayer inspection works pretty much like packet filtering, but in a more sophisticated 
and powerful fashion. Instead of feeding packets to a proxy server, it uses scripting programs and 
a set o f dynamic rules, to track and inspect packets up to the application layer and retrieve the data 
needed to sufficiently secure a service. Thus, products using stateful multilayer inspection do not 
need to design and implement a separate proxy server for each targeted service. Each inbound 
static rule is associated with a outbound dynamic rule. H ie static rales initiate the dynamic rules, 
and the dynamic rules are used to track and monitor the expected replies.
3.5.1 Advantages
Some advantages of stateful multilayer inspection include:
1. Since the filtering rale are dynamic, some kind of context is kept about the network traffic and 
connection. This ensures active monitoring and maintenance;
2. Can support address translation or remapping. Addresses, ports, and identifiers in the packets 
can be rewritten on the other side of die connection using the dynamic rales. Thus, internal IP 
addresses can be easily hidden from die external world;
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3. Traditional packet filtering leaves large gaps in the TCP/UDP port range since quite a few 
services can not be easily filtered. The gaps are narrowed in products using stateful multilayer 
inspection;
4. No separate proxy server is needed for each targeted service;
5. Although stateful multilayer inspection needs to keep track and examine packets dynamically 
up to the highest level, the performance is usually better than proxy servers since no context 
switching is involved for packets.
3.5.2 Disadvantages
It also has some disadvantages:
1. No freeware packages using the technology are available. Thus, it not suitable for a build- 
your-own firewall construction approach;
2. The technology is somewhat more sophisticated than traditional packet filtering and proxy 
servers. Especially the dynamic rule creation requires a comprehensive understanding of the 
service and the security-related details at all levels.
4. FIREWALL ARCHITECTURES
In Chapter 3, we have described commonly used firewall technologies. In practice, when a 
firewall needs to be built based on the security needs of a site, they are a number of architectural 
models that can be followed to put various needed components together to ensure that their 
capacity is maximized.
There are four major firewall architectures: bare-bones screening router architecture, dual- 
homed host architecture, screened host architecture, and screened subnet architecture. Only the 
last three are widely used. A more detailed description about these architectures is given by 
Chapman and Zwicky (1995). In this chapter, I will briefly review these firewall architectures and 
their variations and summarize their pros and cons.
Before we jump into the discussion, let’s further review three key concepts frequently used to 
describe firewall architectures: host, dual-homed host, and bastion host. A host is a computer 
system attached to a network, generally its security mostly relies on whatever is provided by the 
operating system vendor. This level of security is referred to as host security. A dual-homed, or 
multi-homed host is a host that has at least two network hardware addresses and belongs to at least 
two network systems at the same time, thus the adjective dual-homed, or multi-homed. Dual­
homed hosts can be used to run proxy servers. A bastion host is a single-homed host, usually on 
the internal network, used to provide general service(s) to the outside world and/or to run proxy 
servers. Thus, a bastion host is highly vulnerable to outside attack and should be well-fortified. A 
site can setup more than one bastion host to run various kinds of general servers or proxy servers.
4.1 Bare-bones Screening Router
In this architecture, only a router with packet filtering is used to protect the internal system 
(Figure 4). This architecture offers a straightforward and economic approach for firewall 
construction since most sites should already have a router in order to connect to an external system. 
In practice, the screening router is rarely used alone in a firewall architecture due to the 
weaknesses present in traditional packet filtering technology.
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4.1.1 Advantages
The pros of this architecture is mostly related to the advantages of packet filters, please see 
Section 3.2 on page 12 for more detail.
4.1.2 Disadvantages
The cons of this architecture is mostly related to (lie disadvantages of packet filters as well, 
please see Section 3.2 on page 13 for more detail. In addition:
1. The defense is only single-line. If the screening router is compromised, the whole defense 
collapses;
2. Not fail-safe. A malfunctioning router may still pass packets in and out;
3. Direct IP traffic between the protected network and the outside world is allowed.
External Network(s)
Screening Router
Network qZT)
Figure 4. A packet filtering firewall implemented using just a screening router. Based on the 
security policies specified by a site, packets traveling between the internal and external 
networks are either routed or dropped by the screening router.
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4.2 Dual-Homed Host
A dual-homed host firewall architecture, by its name, is a firewall architecture constructed 
using a dual-homed host placed between the internal network and the external internetwork (Figure 
5). A dual-homed host can be configured to have routing capabilities, however, if a dual-homed 
host is intended to be used in a dual-homed firewall architecture, the routing capability should be 
disabled. As a result, no direct flow of packets will occur between the internal and external 
networks. Both the internal and the external networks can directly communicate with the dual­
homed host, the firewall, and the communication between the internal and the external networks 
has to go through the firewall indirectly. Thus, the dual-homed host can run proxy servers or 
firewall products using stateful multilayer inspection.
4.2.1 Advantages
l ire  advantages of tire dual-homed architecture include:
External Network(s)
Dual-Homed Host
□ □
Figure 5. A dual-homed host firewall architecture in which the firewall consists of only one 
component— a dual-homed host with routing capabilities disabled. No direct packet flow 
occurs between the internal and external systems and security is mainly achieved by using 
proxy servers.
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1. The dual-homed host architecture is simple and straightforward;
2. Direct IP traffic between the protected network and the outside world is completely prohibited.
Thus, this architecture can be used to achieve a high level of security;
3. Some types of security breaches can be easily identified in this architecture, such as packets
with external source addresses that appear inside the protected network;
4. The dual-homed host can be used to make sure that the claimed service match the right type of 
data, although this will probably reduce the performance of the firewall. If the service and the 
data do not match, the communication should be considered potentially detrimental and thus 
should be terminated. This is a advantage over packet filters since filters can not be easily 
configured to do this type of work.
4.2.2 Disadvantages
The dual-homed architecture has the following disadvantages:
1. No depth of defense. The defense is only single-line. If the dual-homed host is compromised, 
the whole defense collapses. A very high level of host security is demanded for the dual-homed 
host. Host level security can be enhanced by running a bare-bones standard or proprietary 
operating system;
2. Requires constant effort to maintain the firewall since the dual-homed host has to be 
specifically configured to accommodate the dynamic needs of different services by users;
3. Security is achieved only by proxying needed services. If a site only needs services which can 
be proxied, this architecture is usually recommended;
4. Not suitable for a site who needs quite a few non-standard services that are hard or even 
impossible to be proxied. One can walk around the problem by maintaining user accounts on 
the dual-homed host and ask internal users to bear the inconvenience to directly log into the 
dual-homed host and then communicate with the outside world. This approach is generally not 
a good idea for security management because user accounts have to be maintained outside the 
protection zone of the firewall. User accounts on a dual-homed host may pose potential 
security threats because some of these legitimate users may accidentally “activate” unsafe 
services within the firewall. For better security, other architectural alternatives should be 
considered.
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4.3 Screened Host
The screened host firewall architecture usually consists of two main firewall components: a 
router and a bastion host (Figure 6). The router is used not only to route packets for the external 
internetwork and the bastion host, but also to provide a certain degree of protection for the firewall 
host through packet filtering. Thus the router is essentially a screening router.
Similar to the dual-homed host architecture, no direct flow of packets occurs between the 
outside world and any internal host, except the bastion host. Instead, packet traffic for needed 
services has to go through the bastion host indirectly. Unlike a dual-homed host, a bastion host is 
not dual-homed. Instead, it is simply a host of the internal network with some higher level of host 
security. Insecure outbound traffic is directed to the bastion host first and then to the outsider 
world through the screening router. Insecure inbound traffic is directed through the screening 
router solely to the bastion host and then to various hosts in the internal network. In another word, 
the screening router and the bastion host are configured so that only the bastion host can have 
direct communication for those insecure communications, inbound or outbound, with the external
External Network(s)
Screening Router
Bastion Host
□  Q □
Figure 6. Screened host firewall architecture in which the firewall consists of at least two 
components— a bastion host and a screening router. Direct flow of packets is essential in this 
architecture.
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network.
It should be noted that in this architecture, there is only one line of defense for the protected 
network, although two firewall components are used. The screening router protects the bastion 
host from outsider threats. It can be configured so that the bastion host can only have connections 
with the outside world that are permitted by the security policies of a site. The filter can provides 
security to other internal hosts either by not allowing any direct communication with the outside 
world or the filtering rules can be configured to allow only those secure services. However, 
whether or not direct connection are allowed between other hosts and the external world, the 
protected network may be comprised if there is a break-in in either of the screening router or the 
bastion host.
4.3.1 Advantages
The advantages of the screened host architecture include:
1. Since the firewall has at least two kinds of firewall components, the architecture is more 
flexible than the dual-homed host architecture. Various kinds of services can be secured either 
through packet filtering or through proxying. For many services, this architecture provides a 
stronger and more flexible security for a network if configured properly;
2. Packet filtering is used to prevent hackers from bypassing the bastion host to directly attack a 
host in the protected network. The screening router also provide some protection for the 
bastion host.
4.3.2 Disadvantages
The screened host architecture has the following disadvantages:
1. Unlike the dual-homed host architecture, in which packets with external sources are not 
allowed in the internal network, packets with external sources in this architecture are permitted 
to flow into the internal network This put the protected network at potential risk;
2. There is no depth of defense. Although the firewall consists of two firewall components, the 
defense of this architecture is actually single-line. Both the router and the bastion host are the 
single-point-of-failure places. A break-in into either one means the whole internal system is 
wide open for attack.
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4.4 Screened Subnet
As we can see in the previous two sections, both the dual-homed host and the screened host 
architectures are single-lined firewall defenses. In order to construct a better firewall, some depth 
in the defense is needed.
The screened subnet firewall architecture enhances the screened host architecture by using 
another router to keep the screening router and the bastion host some distance away from the rest 
of the internal system in case either one or both are compromised. The second router is placed 
between the bastion host and the rest of the hosts in the internal system and is referred to as the 
interior router or the choke router. The screening router in the screened host architecture is placed 
between the external internetwork and the bastion host. It does not handle communication for other 
hosts in the internal network in any direct form and is called the exterior router or the access 
router. The bastion host, together with the choke and the access routers, forms a perimeter 
network or subnetwork which is the actual firewall (Figure 7). This perimeter network or 
subnetwork is often nicknamed as the DMZ (the demilitarized zone).
Thus, a screened subnet firewall architecture consists at least three components: an access 
router, a bastion host, and a choke router. Some variations of this architecture exist and will be 
discussed later in the chapter.
The choke router does most the packet filtering for outbound services that can be safely 
supported by a site using packet filtering, these services may include outbound service requests 
such as Telnet, FTP, and other general intranetwork or internetwork browsing requests.
The bastion host is responsible for handling incoming connections such as SMTP, FTP, or 
DNS queries about the site. It is also responsible for running proxy servers for outbound services 
that can not be safely supported using packet filtering by the choke router, of course, assuming 
proxying is feasible for these services.
As a general rule of thumb, the number of services supported between the bastion host and 
internal network should be minimized, simply to reduce the chance of a security breach into the 
internal network. Only those services are absolutely needed by the bastion host should be allowed 
between the bastion host and the protected network, such as SMTP for the bastion host to forward 
e-mail and DNS to communicate with each individual internal host.
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External
Network(s)
Access Router
Bastion Host
Choke Router
Figure 7. Screened subnet firewall architecture in which the firewall consists of at least three 
components— an access router, a bastion host, and a choke router. This is the only basic firewall 
architecture that has some depth of defense and compromise of the access router or a break-in into 
the bastion host does not threat the internal system immediately.
The main responsibility of the access router is to protect the DMZ and the internal system by 
screening incoming traffic using packet filtering. In general, it does not check outbound traffic for 
security purposes, which is usually handled by the bastion host or the choke router, depending on 
the types of services in concern. In practice, the security significance of the access network is 
limited to only blocking incoming packet with forged source address— packets that claim to come 
from a host in the protected network.
4.4.1 Advantages
The advantages of the screened subnet architecture include:
1. This architecture has some true depth of defense. Three lines of defense have to be overcome 
before an attacker can reach any internal host. It provides the internal network some further 
protection than the screened host architecture, although no extra protection is given to die 
bastion host itself. If tiiere is a break-in into the bastion host or the exterior router, the internal
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network is not immediately open for attack thus buying some extra time for the defense 
because of the existence of the access router;
2. Strict internal network traffic does not go beyond the choke router;
3. Better flexibility to support various services than the screened host architecture since the 
firewall consists of three components.
4.4.2 Disadvantages
This architecture is the standard form of a “complete” firewall architecture. Some minor cons 
exist:
1. Much more sophisticated than the other two architectures and requires a comprehensive 
understanding about the various aspects of the firewall;
2. Traffic in the DMZ should not contain any critical information about the protected network 
that can be potentially used by attackers. Thus, firewall software configuration must be done 
with great caution.
4.5 Architectural Variations
In practice, the four standard firewall architectures described can be followed more or less 
flexibly. Depending on the hardware capacity, budget and personnel constraints, and security 
needs of a site, firewall components used in a architecture may be omitted or merged. In this 
section, I will briefly introduce some of the architectural variations.
4.5.1 Combined Dual-Homed Host and Screened Subnet
This architectural hybrid combines a dual-homed host and a screened subnet for the firewall 
construction. The dual-homed host is placed inside the DMZ. Thus, the whole configuration adds 
one more defense line to tire screened subnet architecture. The packet filtering responsibilities of 
the access and choke routers can be significantly reduced and the dual-homed host will take over 
for this part of the work. It provides more fine-tuned control over connections, however, great 
caution needs to be asserted during software configuration since the dual-homed host configuration 
tends to be error-prone. The routers in this variation are mostly used to fight against source 
address forgery. If configured properly, the reliability of the firewall can be greatly enhanced.
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4.5.2 Layered DMZs
This variation uses interleaved bastion hosts and routers to provide different levels of security 
for supported services3, although performance of the firewall is compromised in many cases. The 
least reliable services are provided in the outermost screened subnet and the most reliable ones 
placed in the innermost subnet. It should be noted that for services that are secured using packet 
filtering, the multilayer security is only guaranteed when the layered choke routers are using 
diversified filtering rules, which can hardly be realized in practice.
4.5.3 Multiple DMZs
Similar to the layered DMZ variation, tire multiple DMZs use multiple perimeter networks. 
The major difference is that the perimeter networks in this variation are not layered, instead, they 
are scattered around the system being protected. Multiple DMZs are needed when a system need 
to link to multiple external internetworks and security policies for the communication with external 
systems are not the same. For example, one firewall may be configured to handle communication 
with the Internet, the other may be configured to handle communication with a peer external system 
located in a remote place. The advantage of using this architectural variation is that the DMZs are 
independent of each other, break-in into one will not immediately compromise the other.
4.5.4 Multiple Bastion Hosts
Multiple bastion hosts can be used inside the perimeter network in order to provide certain 
level of redundancy or to increase the overall performance of a DMZ firewall. The multiple bastion 
hosts can be configured to run dedicated special-purpose servers (such as a Web server) or proxy 
servers (such as a file transferring proxy server). Multiple bastion hosts in a screened subnet 
architecture ensure that if one bastion host is compromised, others are not immediately at risk. 
They also allow us to be able to separate pure firewall functions from other services.
3 Usually, this variation has two (at most three) layers of DMZs, which consists of one access router, one bastion 
host in the outer perimeter network, one middle choke router, one bastion host in the inner perimeter network, and 
one inner choke router with direct connection with the internal system.
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4.5.5 Multiple Access Routers
If a site has connections with more than one external systems, multiple access routers can be 
used in a screened subnet firewall architecture. Each access router connects the bastion host with 
an external system and unique filtering rule sets can be specified for each access router. A 
potential problem with this firewall variation is that once the bastion host is compromised, all 
network traffic in the DMZ is exposed.
4.5.6 Single Router or Merged Routers
A powerful and reliable router with multiple network interfaces can be used to handle die 
responsibilities of both the access and choke routers. However, this variation should be used with 
great caution because it possesses the flaws present in the screened host architecture,. For 
instance, if the router is compromised, the whole defense collapses. A break-in into the bastion 
host, tiiough, does not immediately threat the internal system.
4.5.7 Merged Access Router and Bastion Host
This variation uses a dual-homed host to perform the functionality of both the access router 
and the bastion host. It is essentially the same as the standard screened subnet architecture, except 
that the performance and flexibility may be reduced to some extent because of the lack of a 
dedicated access router. If the performance of the firewall is not a big concern for a site, this 
variation is a more economic alternative than a standard screened subnet architecture.
4.6 Architectural Violations
Although the standard firewall architectures can be used more or less flexibly depending on 
the hardware capacity, budget constraints, and security needs of a site, there are certain unsafe 
architectural variations that should be avoided.
4.6.1 Merged Choke Router and Bastion Host
In a screened subnet architecture, the fundamental protection for the internal system is 
provided by the bastion host and die choke router. The access router provides only a limited level 
of protection for the perimeter network. The perimeter network is relatively easy to be
compromised since most sites only use the access router to filter packets with forged source 
addresses. If the choke router and the bastion host are merged using a dual-homed host or some 
other means, all internal network activities will be exposed when there is a break-in into the dual­
homed host— the merged choke router and bastion host. Thus, merging the choke router and the 
bastion host should be avoided in firewall construction.
4.6.2 Multiple Choke Routers
Using multiple choke routers in a screened subnet architecture is also not recommended. In 
fact, any attempts of this sort should be strictly prohibited in firewall construction. Multiple choke 
routers in a firewall may lead to undesirable routing decisions by these routers and may potentially 
leak sensitive internal network information into the perimeter network. Thus, using multiple choke 
routers nullifies the security significance of a choke router in a screened subnet architecture.
5. FIREWALL BUILDING
Having reviewed commonly used firewall technologies and architectures, now let’s turn our 
attention to firewall construction in practice. As a matter of fact, the flexibility in firewall 
construction is sometimes so great that the decisions for a specific network environment may not 
always be so clear to security administrators (Knowles, 1997).
In general, security management follows four major steps (Leinwand and Fang, 1993; Cooper 
et al, 1995):
1) Identify what is needed and what needs to be protected;
2) Find the access points;
3) Secure these access points;
4) Maintain the security mechanisms .
The first step implies that the security management personnel should know or should be 
informed how much network connection, internal and external, is needed and what are the 
resources and devices under their control that must be protected. Then, based on these needs, the 
risk zone should be identified in the context of the internetwork (including the internal system) and 
the potential dangerous access points to the resources and devices should be identified. Next, 
based on the previous analysis, security management personnel should clearly define a set of 
security rules that can be used to isolate the resources and devices needed to be protected from the 
risk zone, by designing security mechanisms to secure these access points. The security policies 
should be defined in terms of what will be allowed and what will not be allowed. The last step 
refers to the ongoing process of maintaining, enhancing, and updating the implemented security 
mechanisms.
The zone of risk consists of areas in an internetwork where hackers can mount malicious 
attacks, areas other forms of danger can originate, and areas where hosts are vulnerable to attacks. 
It includes the Internet at large and any other external network system a site has connection with, 
and the part of the internal network consisting of unprotected TCP/IP-capable and non-capable 
hosts which have some form of unsecured connection with other unprotected TCP/IP-capable hosts 
(Cooper et al, 1995). Non-TCP/IP-capable hosts which are connected to other TCP/IP-capable 
hosts can be compromised through the common protocol(s) used between them.
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When firewalls are considered to be part of the security infrastructure to enhance die overall 
security of a site, the same four steps of security management apply. In this chapter, we will apply 
die materials that have been reviewed in previous chapters to present firewall alternatives for a 
hypothetical example. More specifically, we will apply the information that have been reviewed 
and present alternatives for implementing feasible firewall mechanisms in a hypothetical small 
software development company—identify its security needs, define security policies that will be 
targeted to address these needs, and determine what firewall architecture should be used to enforce 
these policies— as one of the many security aspects. In order to make firewall construction 
possible for this hypothetical example, we have to make a few assumptions. When identifying the 
security needs, only those that can be more or less effectively addressed by using firewall 
techniques are focused on.
5.1 A Hypothetical Example
The hypothetical example is a small software development company, which we will denote as 
HSSDCorp in later discussions. We assume that HSSDCorp consists of a set of institutional 
branches, including Support, Training, Programming, Testing, Sales, Advertising, Accounting, 
top-level Administration, and so on.
First, it is reasonable for us to assume electronic mail is an essential needed service for the 
company as a whole in order to communicate with people inside and outside the company quickly. 
We further assume that the company uses SMTP-based electronic mail rather than a proprietary 
system.
Let’s further assume HSSDCorp produces a series of software products which are more or 
less extensively used across the country and the situation requires the company’s support and 
training personnel to not only keep close contact with its customers from their home base but also 
requires them to periodically travel around to provide on-site training and assistance for the clients. 
While they are traveling and out in the field they also need to keep close contact with the company 
for instant advise and recommendation from the company’s top-level management or experts in a 
particular field. The customers and the support personnel may also need to remotely fetch updated 
product components and patches. In addition, to reduce the work load of field support and training 
personnel, providing on-line customer support is also desirable. For employees working in
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Programming and Testing, the nature of their work does not really require extensive traveling, 
however, let’s assume they are allowed to work at home in order to improve their work 
productivity. Occasionally, when an employee is traveling around the country, s/he may also need 
to access the site remotely. Also, for programmers, being able to surf the Internet and participate 
in the Internet newsgroup discussions are considered essential for their work in order to get tree on­
line expert help for some of their work related problems. For people working in Advertising, Sales, 
and Accounting, their work may require the company to maintain an Internet WWW home page to 
promote the company’s products and to push for on-line sale and billing. For top-level 
Administration, besides basic electronic mail service, on-line job recruiting capability should also 
be provided in order to reduce the cost.
Although in any real-life example the service requirements could be more or less sophisticated 
than what we have assumed, we believe tine assumptions made above are very representative of 
many small-to-medium-sized software development companies with respects to the kind of network 
services needed. Moreover, since our purpose is to provide enough assumptions so we can apply 
the materials that have been reviewed in previous chapters, making our hypothetical example 
typical is not our goal here.
Based on the assumptions given above, we conclude that, collectively, HSSDCorp needs the 
following network services: inbound and outbound electronic mail, inbound and outbound tile 
transfer, inbound remote network access, Internet browsing, and newsgroup service. In addition, it 
also needs to maintain a WWW home page for on-line marketing, customer feedback, bug report, 
customer support, job recruiting, and so on. Anonymous file transfer service should also be 
provided to post software updates or patches, demo versions, and so forth.
Based on the above assumptions, let’s start our firewall building process. Before we begin, 
let’s state that since our example is a small software development company, we will ignore any 
internal network diversification and will not discuss any potential internal firewall alternatives.
We further assume that these needs justify an Internet connection, and that the presence of the 
company on the Internet will be permanent. We assume the company will use a leased-line 
connection with the Internet.
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5.2 Security Analysis
For the network services either needed by the company or that need to be provided to lire 
outside world, we will first analyze the security concerns associated with each of these services. 
After the needs have been decided, our next step is to define a set of security polices that can be 
used to fulfill the needs in terms of what should be allowed or denied. As far as the firewall is 
concerned, only those policies that are targeted to keep outsiders out from a site will be focused on 
since firewalls are not intended to fight against threats that originate from the internal system.
5.2.1 General
There are a few general security policies that apply to any network systems. First, we should 
eliminate address spoofing attacks in which incoming packets claim to be from the internal system 
or from the bastion host in the DMZ. These type of attack can be screened out using packet 
filtering rules. There maybe some external hosts or networks that cause security concerns, and 
thus are considered unsafe. Any kind of connection with these hosts should be denied until their 
reputation is restored. If we are to use a screened subnet architecture, we should also block any 
TCP connection requests initiated by external hosts. In general, we should allow reply TCP 
packets since these type of packets generally do not pose any security concerns.
For specific protocols, we should specify our packet filtering rules to control the flow of 
packets or we can use proxy services to secure the protocol if packet filtering is not safe enough or 
not feasible. All other kind of packets that are not specifically allowed should be denied based on 
the firewall default-deny principle, such as external requests for X I 1, RPC, or “r ” services (rlogin, 
rsh, rep, and etc.).
Table 1 and Table 2 summaries some filtering rules used to enforce these general security 
policies, assuming we are to use a screened subnet architecture in our firewall design (see Section 
5.3).
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Table 1. Packet filtering rules in the access router for general security policies. The general rules are similar to that 
used in the choke router, except that incoming packet claim to be from the DMZ will be dropped.
Direction Action Source
Address
Source
Port
Destination
Address
Destination
Port
Protocol 
Flags Option
Description
Incoming Deny Internal * * * * Prevent address spoofing
Incoming Deny DMZ * * * * Prevent address spoofing
Incoming Allow * * * * ACK = 1 Allow reply from ext. servers
Incoming Deny Ext. hosts on 
the black list
* * * * Deny connection with ext. hosts 
that are on the black list
Rules for .specific protocols
Incoming Deny * * * * Default deny for incoming packet
Outgoing Deny * * * * Default deny for outgoing packet
Table 2. Packet filtering rules in the choke router for general security policies.
Direction Action Source
Address
Source
Port
Destination
Address
Destination
Port
Protocol 
Flags Option
Description
Incoming Deny Internal * * * * Prevent address spoofing
Incoming Allow * * * * ACK = 1 Allow reply from ext. servers
Incoming Deny Ext. hosts on 
the black list
* * * * Deny connection with ext. hosts 
that are on the black list
Rules for specific protocols
Incoming Deny * * * * Default deny for incoming packet
Outgoing Deny * * * * Default deny for outgoing packet
5.2.2 Electronic Mail
E-mail, inbound and outbound, is an essential service for almost any site. Since e-mail is used 
with very high frequency and it allows almost all kinds of data to be sent and received across 
networks, this service poses great challenges to system administrators on how to secure mail 
transport agents, delivery and user agents (Schneier, 1995).
In a mail system, the mail transport agent receives messages directly from external hosts; the 
delivery agent distributes messages to different users; the user agent runs various kinds of 
programs in response to the message it received. Thus, the transport agent is vulnerable to 
command channel attacks. The delivery and user agents are at risk under data-driven attacks.
The basic open protocol used for electronic mail exchange is SMTP, which is a store-and- 
forward system. On most UNIX machines, Sendmail is the widely used mail transport agent for 
SMTP. Sendmail uses a privileged port (port 25) for incoming SMTP connection. The main
security problem associated with Sendmail is that, due to some design and implementation bugs, 
many versions have security holes that allow hackers to steal the superuser privileges and mount 
command channel attacks.
To avoid command channel and data-driven attacks associated with a mail system, incoming 
mail messages should never flow directly to any internal mail server. This essentially leaves us 
only one firewall alternative—the screened subnet architecture running a secured proxy SMTP 
server4 on a bastion host in the DMZ. To avoid incoming mail messages to directly go to an 
internal mail server, we can use packet filtering to direct all inbound SM TP connections to the 
SM TP proxy server running on a bastion host. Then the proxy server in the DMZ will direct the 
messages to a secured internal mail server. The bastion host needs to forward e-mail to the internal 
network, thus SMTP has to be supported between the bastion host and the internal network (Table 
3).
Table 3. Packet filtering rules used in the choke router for SMTP.
Direction Action Source Source
Port
Destination Destination
Port
Protocol 
Flags Option
Description
Outgoing Allow Internal > 1023 Bastion 
SMTP server
25 * Allow outbound mail between 
the bastion host and int. hosts
Incoming Allow Bastion 
SMTP server
25 Internal > 1023 ACK = 1
Incoming Allow Bastion 
SMTP seiver
> 1023 Internal 
SMTP server
25 * Allow inbound mail between the 
bastion host and int. SMTP 
serverOutgoing Allow Internal 
SMTP seiver
25 Bastion 
SMTP seiver
> 1023 ACK = 1
Table 4. Packet filtering rules used in the access router for SMTP.
Direction Action Source Source
Port
Destination Destination
Port
Protocol 
Flags Option
Description
Outgoing Allow Bastion 
SMTP server
>1023 External 
SMTP server
25 ACK = 0, 1 Allow outbound mail between 
the bastion host and ext. hosts
Incoming Allow External 
SMTP server
25 Bastion 
SMTP seiver
>1023 ACK = 1
Incoming Allow External 
SMTP server
> 1023 Bastion 
SMTP server
25 ACK = 0, 1 Allow inbound mail between 
the bastion host and ext. hosts
Outgoing Allow Bastion 
SMTP server
25 External 
SMTP seiver
>1023 ACK = 1
4 Electronic mail is often passed through a proxy server, no matter what other components are used in a firewall 
design.
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Most store-and-forward systems are easy to be secured by using proxy services. TIS FW TK 
provides a mail proxy service, smap and smapd for UNIX systems. The proxy service can prevent 
hackers to connect directly to Sendmail, instead, outside SMTP servers have to speak to smapd in 
order to delivery any mail messages.
SM TP is a TCP-based protocol, which implies that packet filters can be configured so that 
inbound and outbound electronic mail exchange only occur between external hosts and a firewall 
SM TP server, and between a firewall SMTP server and the internal SMTP server (Table 3 and 
Table 4).
5.2.3 File Transfer
The generic version FTP is widely used in the Internet community to transfer files across 
networks. FTP is a TCP-based protocol and is easy to setup. To be able to provide the service, 
FTP needs to establish two TCP connections. One connection is used by the client to send 
commands to the server and to receive reply from the server. The other is used to transfer files to 
tine client once permission is granted by the server.
Further, an FTP session can be run in two modes: normal mode and passive mode. In the 
normal mode, the client uses two random ports above 1023 for the two connections respectively, 
and the server uses port 21 for the command connection and port 20 for the data connection. The 
client first uses one of the random ports and opens the command connection with the server’s port 
21. Immediately after receiving the server’s acknowledgment, the client uses the PORT command 
and tells the server the second port it has allocated for the channel. The data connection is initiated 
by the server using port 20 in response to the client’s PORT command. In the passive mode, the 
client first opens the command connection and immediately after receiving the server’s 
acknowledgment it uses the PASV command and tell the server to allocate a random port for the 
data channel. After receiving the server’s acknowledgment, the client initiates the data channel 
connection.
5.2.3.1 Client
Since a normal mode outbound FTP session involves an inbound data channel connection, 
securing it using packet filtering is not feasible if we are not allowing any inbound TCP
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connections. To run FTP clients using normal mode, we need to use a proxy server so the 
connection can be relayed.
In the passive mode, packet filtering is feasible for the client since both connections are 
initiated by the client. Most Web browsers has built-in FTP clients that support passive mode 
FTP. If we are allowing internal users to surf the Internet using certain types of Web browsers, it 
will be more cost-effective to simply use these built-in FTP clients to reduce the work load for 
system administrators.
We can configure the firewall to secure internal FTP clients that support passive mode FTP 
using packet filtering, Table 5 shows how.
Table 5. Packet filtering rules used in both the choke and the access routers for FTP clients that support passive 
mode.
Direction Action Source Source
Port
Destination Destination
Port
Protocol 
Flags Option
Description
Outgoing Allow Internal > 1023 * 21 ACK = 0 Allow outgoing passive mode 
FTP connectionsIncoming Allow * 21 Internal > 1023 ACK = 1
Outgoing Allow Internal > 1023 * > 1023 ACK = 0
Incoming Allow * > 1023 Internal > 1023 ACK = 1
There are times when packet filtering on FTP clients that support passive mode is not feasible, 
and we have to consider using proxy mechanisms to secure FTP clients. In this case, we still need 
to specify the filtering rules to support this kind of connection (Table 6 and Table 7). Normal 
mode FTP sessions are easy to secure using proxy servers in which requests initiated by the real 
server to establish the data channel do not go directly to the client. The trouble associated with 
using freeware FTP proxy servers such as SOCKS and TIS FW TK is that they require modified 
clients or client procedures, and these are somewhat time consuming to setup. However, most Web 
browsers such as Netscape Navigator support proxy features for their built-in FTP client. Thus, 
Web browsers offer feasible alternatives for outbound FTP.
Table 6. Packet filtering rules used in the choke router to enable normal mode FTP proxy connections.
Direction Action Source Source
Port
Destination Destination
Port
Protocol 
Flags Option
Description
(Outgoing Allow Internal > 1023 Bastion 
FTP Server
21 ACK = 0 Allow outgoing FTP command 
connections to bastion host
Incoming Allow Bastion 
FTP Server
21 Internal > 1023 ACK = 1
Incoming Allow Bastion 
FTP Server
> 1023 Internal > 1023 ACK = 0 Allow incoming FTP data 
connections from bastion host
Outgoing Allow Internal > 1023 Bastion 
FTP Server
> 1023 ACK = 1
Table 7. Packet filtering rules used in the access router to enable normal mode FTP proxy connections.
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Direction Action Source Source
Port
Destination Destination
Port
Protocol 
Flags Option
Description
Outgoing Allow Bastion 
FTP Server
>1023 External 
FTP Server
21 ACK = 0 Allow outgoing FTP command 
connections to ext. hosts
Incoming Allow External 
FTP Server
21 Bastion 
FTP Server
> 1023 ACK = 1
Incoming Allow External 
FTP Server
20 Bastion 
FTP Server
> 1023 ACK = 0 Allow incoming FTP data 
connections from ext. hosts
Outgoing Allow Bastion 
FTP Server
> 1023 External 
FTP Server
20 ACK = 1
5.2.3.2 Server
There are two types of FTP services that can be offered: anonymous FTP and user-oriented 
FTP. The first kind is intended for the Internet community while the later is usually intended for 
company employees that are traveling on the road or working at home.
Anonymous FTP Service
For information that are intended to be publicly accessible, anonymous FTP can be offered. 
Anonymous FTP prevents real login and password information from passing over the network. It 
is easy to setup and with anonymous FTP one can restrict user actions by defining the permissions 
of the “guest” account. Anonymous FTP can also restrict users’ access to the file system. As a 
rule of thumb, anonymous FTP server should not be run internally, instead it should be run in the 
perimeter network if we are to choose the screened subnet architecture (see Section 5.3). Table 8 
shows the filtering rules used in the access router for inbound anonymous FTP request. Packets 
associated with inbound anonymous FTP request will be denied by default in the choke router.
Table 8. Packet filtering rules used in the access router to enable normal mode and passive mode FTP service 
provided in the perimeter zone.
Direction Action Source Source
Port
Destination Destination
Port
Protocol 
Flags Option
Description
Incoming Allow External > 1023 Bastion 21 ACK = 0 Allow guest FTP command 
connectionsOutgoing Allow Bastion 21 External > 1023 ACK = 1
Outgoing Allow Bastion 20 External > 1023 ACK = 0 Allow guest FTP data 
connections, normal modeIncoming Allow External > 1023 Bastion 20 ACK = 1
Incoming Allow External > 1023 Bastion > 1023 ACK = 0 Allow guest FTP data 
connections, passive modeOutgoing Allow Bastion > 1023 External > 1023 ACK = 1
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User-Oriented FTP Service
To the Internet community, we should not consider offering user-oriented FTP services 
because of high possibility of potential security breaches. However, there are times we need to 
offer user-oriented FTP services to company employees who are traveling on the road or working 
at home, when the information we want to provide is privileged and access to data needs to be 
controlled.
As a commonly used network protocol, FTP itself is not particularly insecure, but the basic 
operation of the protocol is. When we allow a user to use FTP to download tiles from your site, 
the user is entering his/her login and password over a non-encrypted path. Thus, we run potential 
risks by allowing user-oriented FTP in the internal system because hackers may sniff a legitimate 
user’s login information and then get access to the protected network. In general, users should not 
be allowed to use FTP to directly connect to an internal host.
Since we have assumed that user-oriented FTP service is needed by the company, we can 
provide the service by trying to setup a more secure version of user-oriented FTP service or by 
using secured remote dial-up access.
A widely used secure version of FTP is the Washington University (WU) FTP. The protocol 
provides a few security features, including secure authentication— control user access based on 
group ID, sophisticated logging functions, and automatic service shutdown. W U FTP is also very 
suitable for handling large archives. The question is where we should run a WU FTP server in 
order to provide the user-oriented file transferring service. Since we have been trying to avoid 
inbound TCP connection to the internal system, running it internally will mean that we have to 
open a hole in our defense. A better solution is to run a WU FTP server on a dedicated bastion 
host in the perimeter network of a screened subnet architecture and provide user-oriented file 
transferring service using that server. Of course, configuration of the server needs great caution. 
Besides password-protected user access, sensitive data have to be further protected using other 
mechanisms such as encryption. File maintenance on the server should not be a big burden since 
authorized internal users can freely access tins server.
We can choose to maintain an internal FTP server and allow secured remote dial-up access 
for user-oriented FTP service. Since the security of remote dial-up access is a topic of its own and 
is not firewall related, we will not discuss it further.
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Another alternative is to use commercial file transferring services with encryption and secure 
authentication, however, this requires us to purchase and use both the servers and tire clients.
5.2.4 Remote Network Access
We have also assumed that internal users may need access to the internal system remotely, 
especially those who are working at home may frequently need to access sensitive files and need 
remote login capabilities.
General firewall techniques can offer little help to secure inbound remote access requests. 
Mainly, we have to resort to other security measures such as call-back dial-up or other strong 
authentication mechanisms in order to achieve security. For instance, the remote access server in 
Microsoft Windows NT (RAS) enables an external host to dial in and see the entire network if it 
has permissions, which maintains security with the dial-in clients, and security can be further 
enforced using callback connections. Since remote access servers are to be used to access internal 
network resources and information, they should be placed on the internal network. Modem pools 
used for this purpose should also be placed on the internal network.
Some firewall vendors may provide products which allow high encryption and secure 
authentication using mechanism such as one-time password schemes.
Since this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, we will not discuss it further. However, it 
is important to note that although the alternatives are not firewall-related, their security should not 
be viewed as less significant than that of a firewall.
5.2.5 Network News
To participate in the Internet news activities, a site needs to maintain a news server in order to 
receive and post Usenet news. Maintaining news service is resource intensive, it requires a lot of 
space to store the news and a lot of CPU time to process the news. Because our example is a 
small- to medium- sized company, it really does not need to function as a news feeder and there is 
no need to maintain a news server for internal discussions either. In this case, it will be more cost- 
effective not to maintain a news server. Instead, it may be much easier to rely on an ISP to provide 
such a service for the internal users. In fact, most ISPs provide such services for their clients. We
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can allow internal users to use their Web browsers to participate in the Usenet news discussion 
since most browsers have built-in Usenet clients.
Table 9. Packet filtering rules used in both the choke and the access routers for outbound NNTP connections.
Direction Action Source Source
Port
Destination Destination
Port
Protocol 
Flags Option
Description
Outgoing Allow Internal > 1023 * 119 ACK = 0 Allow outgoing NNTP traffic
Incoming Allow * 119 Internal > 1023 ACK = 1
The most commonly used protocol for network news transferring is NNTP. NNTP runs over 
TCP. The server uses port 119 and the NNTP client can use any port greater than 1023. Similar 
to SMTP, NNTP is also a store-and-forward system, which means that a proxy is also feasible. 
Since NNTP news feeders can be trusted more than random mail senders, direct flow of network 
news can be allowed between the news feeders and the internal news clients with the assistance of 
some packet filtering rules (Table 9). NNTP related command channel attacks are very difficult for 
attackers, although NNTP related data-driven attacks have occurred before.
5.2.6 WWW Service
Not only we would like to allow our employees to use their Web browsers, such as Netscape 
Navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer, to access the Internet, we also want to publish our own 
Web pages in order to post or offer on-line marketing, product or service announcements, custom 
support, product reviews or demos, price guides, product updates or patches, and corporate 
information, etc.
The standard WWW protocol is the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). HTTP is also a 
protocol that runs over TCP. HTTP clients can use any port over 1023. The vast majority of 
HTTP servers on the Internet use port 80 but some don’t.
5.2.6.1 Client
Besides HTTP, most Web clients (NCSA Mosaic, Netscape Navigator, or Microsoft Internet 
Explorer) also allow users to navigate efficiently with links to other services such as FTP, Gopher, 
and WAIS, etc. These browsers are not only GUI capable, they are also designed to be highly 
extensible, which means that they are designed to be able to handle many data formats. The built-in
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functionality of these clients only support a few basic data types such as HTML, GIF, and plain 
text. Other types of data lbrmat, present and future, are intended to be supported by using add-ins 
or applications that are linked to the browsers5. For instance, if someone needs to view an object 
of a graphic format not directly supported by Netscape Navigator in Microsoft Windows, s/he can 
install an add-in viewing application which supports that particular graphical data format so the 
object can be viewed. In X Windows, Netscape Navigator can be configured to call ghostview to 
process data in postscript format.
On the positive side, the high extensibility of these Web clients is the driving force behind the 
rapid growth of the Internet. On the negative side, the high extensibility opens many opportunities 
for malicious hackers to attack sites using these clients. The external applications that can be 
launched by Web browsers can possibly be used by hackers to attack machines running these 
clients. For example, in the case of launching ghostview to view postscript data, hackers can insert 
file I/O commands in the postscript data to modify or destroy the files on the client machine. CGI 
programs embedded in Internet Web pages can potentially do a lot damages to a client. Java 
programs can be used for service-denial attacks.
Table 10. Packet filtering rules for HTTP used in the access router of a screened subnet architecture.
Direction Action Source Source
Port
Destination Destination
Port
Protocol 
Flags Option
Description
(Xitgoing Allow Bastion 
HTTP Server
> 1023 * * ACK = 0 Allow request from bastion 
HTTP server to ext. server
Incoming Allow * * Bastion 
HTTP Server
> 1023 ACK = 1 Allow reply from ext. servers to 
bastion HTTP server
Incoming Allow * > 1023 Bastion 
HTTP Server
80 ACK = 0 Allow request from ext. client
Outgoing Allow Bastion 
HTTP Server
SO * >1023 ACK = 1 Allow reply from bastion servers
Table 11. Packet filtering rules for HTTP used in the choke router of a screened subnet architecture.
Direction Action Source Source
Port
Destination Destination
Port
Protocol 
Flags Option
Description
Outgoing Allow Internal > 1023 Bastion 
HTTP Server
80 ACK = 0 Allow request from int. client 
to bastion HTTP server
Incoming Allow Bastion 
HTTP Server
80 Internal > 1023 ACK = 1 Allow reply from to bastion 
HTTP server
Incoming Deny * * Internal 80 ACK = 0 Deny request from ext. client
Outgoing Deny Internal 80 * * ACK = 1 Deny reply from int. servers
5 These applications are local and even remote programs that are used by Web browsers to display, play, preview, or 
print data of non-basic data format which are usually not supported by the browsers’ built-in features.
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Hence, to secure a Web client, we propose the following policies:
1) If internal users are allowed to use Web browsers to access information on the Internet, they 
should be urged not to modify their browsing related configuration files or this must be done in 
accordance to specific company security policies;
2) Machines that have sensitive information stored on them should not be allowed to run Web 
browsers;
3) Allow internal users to surf Internet Web pages from servers running on both port 80 and non­
standard ports above 1023.
To enforce the above policies, we propose the following solutions:
1) Write shell scripts to frequently check that browser configuration files are not modified by 
users or they are modified in accordance to company policies. Especially, do not allow users 
to run certain privileged shells, spreadsheet, or word-processing applications to automatically 
view downloaded data;
2) Disable Web browsing applications on those machines storing sensitive data (users with 
sensitive data on their workstations may be able to run a browser on a remote machine using X 
Windows);
3) Use packet filtering to allow internal users to surf the Internet Web pages running on standard 
port 80, see Table 10 and Table 11. We can use proxy servers, such as the Cern HTTP proxy 
server or TIS FW TK proxy server, http-gw, to allow internal users to surf the Internet Web 
pages running on non-standard ports.
52.6.2 Server
To publish Web pages on the Internet, the company needs to maintain a Web server6.
HTTP-based servers are simple and the security concerns associated with them are limited.
But similar to HTTP-based clients, HTTP-based HTTP servers frequently rely on external
applications. For instance, customized Web pages can be generated by most servers running
external CGI or Java scripts. If hackers can find a way to modify or even to replace these external
6 Of course, we do not necessarily need to maintain our own Web server in order to publish Web pages on the 
Internet. We can choose to subscribe to an ISP or other vendors that maintain Web servers for their clients.
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applications, the server machine can be potentially compromised. For this reason, the machine 
running the server should never be trusted and by no means should it be placed on the internal 
network. Also, internal users should not be allowed to run their own Web servers for outside 
access— such efforts can be nullified by using packet filtering.
Using Web pages to allow customers to buy products and services over the Internet is a bit 
tricky. If on-line marketing is also intended, then die protection of the confidentiality of user data 
(such as credit card numbers) becomes a critical issue. This requires secure connection between a 
clients and the server. In this case, we need to maintain or purchase a secure Web server that can 
provide cryptographic protection of data and authentication of users. Some commercial Web 
servers offer high levels of authentication by user ID and by source IP address. For instance, 
Netscape’s Secure Commerce Web server has embedded digital user authentication and 
cryptographic protection of data. One of the leading secure Web protocols is the Secure HTTP. 
Essentially, S-HTTP is a variation of HTTP.
Hence, to secure a Web server, we propose the following policies:
1) Deny external users access to internally maintained HTTP servers.
2) The machine that is running the server should never be trusted. The server must be configured 
carefully so that it only can access the data we want to make public.
3) Write and use only secure scripts on the server.
To enforce the above policies, we propose the following solutions:
1) We can use packet filtering to deny external users to access internal Web servers in case any 
unauthorized internal servers are accessed by hackers (see Table 11). If a user sets up a server 
using a port above 1023, outside access to it will be denied by default.
2) Run the server in a restricted environment. Give the server as few privileges as possible. The 
server will have to be started using the root privilege, but after the server is up, we should 
change the user ID so it has only the privileges needed to run the server. Since we are also 
doing on-line marketing using the same server, sensitive user data must not be saved on the 
same machine.
3) Require that experienced secure script writers review all the scripts to be placed on the server.
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5.3 Which Firewall Architecture to Choose?
We have discussed the security concerns about services we want to use on the Internet and to 
provide to the Internet community. We also have covered very briefly services needed to be 
provided to employees physically working outside the company or traveling on the road, such as 
the inbound user-oriented FTP service and inbound remote access service. These are difficult to 
secure using general firewall techniques.
In order to safely provide e-mail service, we will need to maintain a pair of mail servers. We 
will maintain an intermediate secure SMTP server in the perimeter network so incoming e-mail 
messages can be directed first to this server. Using a bare-bone screening router architecture is out 
of the question. Using a dual-homed host architecture will bring us too many inconvenience for 
protocols that can be secured using packet filtering. Using a screened host architecture is feasible 
for e-mail services, however, this architecture is too dangerous to be considered because the 
defense is only single-line. This leaves us the screened subnet firewall architecture. Better yet, we 
will use the multiple-bastion-hosts variation of the screened subnet architecture so the servers in 
the DMZ can be run on dedicated machines (Figure 8).
To support internal Web clients, we do not really need a screened subnet architecture. It is 
acceptable to use a screened host architecture since we can run proxy servers in the internal bastion 
host in order to use external services which are not using standard ports, and rely on packet 
filtering to use external services which are using standard ports. However, to publish our Web 
pages, it is unacceptable to run the Web server in a internal bastion host. We will have to choose 
an architecture similar to the screened subnet architecture so the server can be maintained in the 
DMZ which is some distance away from the internal system. On-line marketing requires us to run 
a secure version of HTTP server. This architecture also allow internal users to access our own 
Web servers. Again, the server will be run on a dedicated bastion host.
Hie same is true when it comes to anonymous file transferring service. If we also want to 
offer user-oriented file transferring service through the firewall, we have to run a secure file 
transferring server, such as the WU FTP server, so external hosts can be strictly authenticated and 
data is properly encrypted.
For remote access servers and user-oriented file transferring service, a feasible alternative is 
to use non-firewall security measures such as a remote access server that supports call-back dial­
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up, strict authentication, and strong data encryption. The servers need to be maintained internally 
(Figure 8). We can also use internal firewalls so the more sensitive internal network segments are 
separated from those less sensitive ones.
The screened subnet architecture provides us multilayer defense and great flexibility on how 
to secure inbound and outbound services.
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Figure 8. A proposed firewall alternative for the hypothetical example.
6. SUMMARY
Today’s network technologies offer us lots of freedom to send and receive data across 
networks to allow communication and resource sharing. However, network usage also brings us 
many potential security risks. To minimize the disruption caused by intentional and unintentional 
intrusions into an internal network, various measures have to be taken to ensure the security of 
information and network resources.
Security management covers a lot of areas, such as security-related planning, policies, 
standards and procedures, documentation, testing, monitoring, maintenance, incident response, 
physical protection, personnel management, and so on (Garfmkel and Spafford, 1996). Many 
tilings, social and technical, have to be done in order to secure a network system. Some authors 
(Lynch and Rose, 1993) categorize network security into architectural security and operational 
security to distinguish its different aspects. Whatever the taxonomy, we should realize that only 
focusing on one or merely a few aspects of network security can not ensure that a network can be 
reasonably secured.
Firewalls are part of a good “defense in depth” strategy, but they are only one of the many 
layers needed to secure an internal network. They must be used “in addition to” and not “instead 
o f ’ other security measures
There are also many levels of network security. We can choose to do nothing and rely on 
whatever the system vendor has provided us. We can also choose to let insiders have some but 
incomplete knowledge about the system— security through obscurity. We can opt to achieve 
security by making sure that every host in the system is secure, but this works only when we have a 
limited number of hosts. Systems such as Kerberos, Secure RPC, ssh, and Secure IP can be used 
to secure the communication between a set of hosts in a hostile environment. Host security is 
always an essential part for the overall security of a site for defending against various forms of 
attacks, internal or external. However, when we have a network that have dozens of hosts, security 
at the host level will not be enough and maintaining a high level of host security for each individual 
host requires close cooperation of users and is too costly. In this situation, we need security at the 
network level.
Firewalls can provide security for a network of hosts. A firewall offers a relatively low-cost 
and high-quality way to fight against most threats that come from outside network systems.
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Traditional firewall approaches include packet filtering, proxy services, and circuit-level gateways. 
Advanced firewall techniques such as the stateful multilayer inspection are also gaining industrial 
strength. There are various firewall architectures we can use to put the components needed to 
implements our security needs. Commonly used architectures include the screening router 
architecture, the dual-homed bastion host architecture, the screened host architecture, and the 
screened subnet architecture. Each firewall architecture has its own built-in security philosophy to 
meet certain types of security needs.
A number of enhanced features have been made available in some commercial firewall 
products in recent years. Stateful multilayer inspection is an advanced and dynamic form of packet 
filtering, which eliminates the need for separate proxy servers for services that need to be secured. 
Firewall-monitoring functions in integrated enterprise-management platforms let administrators to 
perform tasks from a single, local or remote, console (Shell, 1997). Automatic management 
response to firewall alarms is also a welcome feature. Most of these products also support user- 
friendly GUI that makes once tedious firewall configuration work a lot more easier than it was ever 
before.
Building and maintaining firewalls is a ongoing process; policy has to be enforced and the 
system should be frequently maintained. Firewall maintenance requires security personnel possess 
a good knowledge in computer hardware and software, how operating systems and networks work, 
and understand the historical context of current technologies involved, and deep understanding of 
information protection issues.
If potential losses are of high value, the security posture assessment is also necessary as part 
of the security enforcement. This includes surveying different work groups by security 
administrators, writing up survey documentation and analyze the result, and updating security 
plans/policies.
In order to apply the material that has been reviewed in this paper, we have made a few 
assumptions so we can build a firewall on our own to secure the needed services. It is important to 
point out that the build-your-own strategy presented here allows system administrators to 
understand firewalls better, however, support and maintenance is definitely a long-term concern.
On the other hand, as commercial firewall products become more affordable and more 
reliable, many organizations are trying to catch up with the “firewall rush” . It is important to note 
that commercial firewall products are not the ultimate solution to the issues of information and
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resource protection, although they can help us a great deal— as Cohen (1995) has pointed out: 
“protection is something you do, not something you buy.”
APPENDIX: FIREWALL PRODUCTS
Cern WWW Service
Developed in the birthplace of the World-Wide Web, the European Laboratory for Practice Physics, 
Switzerland, the Cern WWW is one of the few commonly used HTTP servers on the Internet. It can be 
configured to run in proxy mode in which the Cern server works pretty much the same way as the TIS 
FWTK. It requires tire modification of proxy clients in many cases, but it provides a more transparent 
service than TIS FWTK. The performance of Cern WWW server when used as a proxy server is also 
better than TIS FWTK because it has a data-cache feature.
List Price: Freeware
Web Site: FTP//www.w3.org
Checkpoint Firewall-1
Supports dynamic packet filtering (stateful multilayer inspection). The innovative design allows the 
product to support almost all services. In the case of FTP, it monitors commands sent over the FTP 
command channel and notices the PORT command the client sends to the server. It will allow the server 
to open die data channel but applies a dme-out limit, although hackers might use this “time-out” window 
to mount an attack. According to the evaluations done by Snyder (1997) and Carreon et al (1996), diis 
product offers an excellent transparent path between the internal and external systems and a very friendly 
configuration GUI.
List Price: $18,900
Web Site. ?
Cisco Systems Routers
Routers made by the Cisco Systems, Inc. are widely used by many organizations today to connect to 
die Internet. The products are considered high performance routers with good packet filtering 
capabilities. The routers run a very complicated real-time operating system called the Internetwork 
Operating System (IOS) which is tailored to perform high speed routing and packet filtering. The 
products provide a relatively easy configuration interface.
List Price: ?
Web Site: ?
Gauntlet Internet Firewall
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Possibly the best firewall product on the market so far (Carreon et al, 1996), this commercial product 
offers both text-based menus and a Web-based GUI. It allows no direct access to the internal system and 
support a slew of authentication schemes. However, for some reason the package does not support 
SOCKS-based clients.
List Price: $15,000
Web Site: ?
ON Guard Firewall
The ON Guard Firewall is a dedicated, Intel-based PC with a proprietary operating system that is 
administrated using the ON Guard Manager software. It supports stateful multilayer inspection. The 
firewall provides a GUI configuration called Master Security Plan (MSP) that protects an internal system 
by controlling inbound and outbound traffic that passes the firewall. User services can be “enabled” or 
“disabled” using the MSP. As a commercial firewall producer, ON guard offers little technical details 
about its products.
List Price; Unknown
Web Site: http://www.on.com
Socks
The original version of SOCKS consists of two major parts: client libraries and a generic server. 
The package is usually used on a dual-homed host to provide proxy services for FTP, Telnet, finger, and 
whois, etc. SOCKS client libraries are supported in platforms such as UNIX, MS Windows, and 
Macintosh, which consist of a set of standard socket library calls, such as connec(), bind(), listen(), and 
accept(). The server supports only UNIX systems, but is accessible by clients running on any supported 
platforms.
The latest version of SOCKS, SOCKS 5.0, has become a recognized standard for proxy systems. 
SOCKS 5.0 works at the transport layer and allows users to set up circuit-level gateways between a user 
and a protected system, thus it is more flexible than application-level proxy servers. SOCKS 5.0 also 
provides strong authentication and encryption features, thus it is suitable for providing services such as 
on-line marketing or remote network access.
List Price: Freeware
Web Site: ftp://ftp.nec.com
TIS FWTK
56
The TIS Firewall Toolkit usually runs on a dual-homed host, which contains a variety of useful tools 
and proxy services that can help to secure a LAN from external threats. The application contains a lile 
called netacl which specifies access information and works in conjunction with inetd; thus it can help 
control services supported by inetd (such as ftpd and httpd). It also provides a secured mail application 
(smap and smapd) which handles basic e-mail functions in a secure fashion, and an FTP daemon that 
enables one to run anonymous FTP server inside a firewall. Proxy servers provided by TIS FWTK include 
ftp-gw, plug-gw (for socket-to-socket service), and tn-gw (for Telnet service). These proxy servers do not 
require client user interface be modified.
List Price: Freeware
Web Site: ftp://ftp.tis.com
WU FTP
Developed in the Washington University (WU) in St. Louis, WU FTP is very suitable for providing a 
secure version of user-oriented FTP service. The protocol provides a few security features, including 
control user access based on group ID, sophisticated logging functions for uploads and downloads, and 
automatic service shutdown. WU FTP is also very suitable for handling large archives.
List Price: Freeware
Web Site: ftp://wuarchive.wustl.edu
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